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Abstract
We model how the choices by students to “rush” a fraternity, and the choices by a
fraternity of whom to admit, interact with the signals that firms receive about student
productivities to determine labor market outcomes. Both the fraternity and students
care about future wages and fraternity socializing values. We first show that if the
signals firms receive about students are either perfectly informative or perfectly noisy,
then fraternity membership has no impact on labor market outcomes. For intermediate
signaling technologies, however, three types of equilibria can exist: pessimistic beliefs
by firms about the abilities of fraternity members can support an equilibrium in which
no one pledges; optimistic beliefs can lead to higher wages for fraternity members
than non-members, so that in equilibrium everyone whom the fraternity would like
to admit actually pledges; and an equilibrium in which most fraternity members have
intermediate abilities—less able students apply, hoping to be mixed in with better
students, but are rejected unless they have high fraternity socializing values, while most
very able students do not apply to avoid being tainted in labor market outcomes due
to being mixed in with less able fraternity members. We provide sufficient conditions
for this latter “hump-shaped” equilibrium to exist, take the model to the data and
show that this equilibrium can reconcile the ability distribution of fraternity members
at the University of Illinois. Finally, we estimate the welfare impact of the fraternity
on different students.
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JEL: J31, D82, H4
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1 Introduction
To many, the word “fraternities” brings to mind images of beer, parties and fun. Yet, frater-
nity membership also enters prominently the job seeking process of many students: resumes
often devote scarce space to highlighting a student’s society memberships in addition to the
standard information about education, work experience, awards, etc. This suggests that
fraternity membership helps employers evaluate a person’s productivity. On first impres-
sion it is not clear why fraternity or sorority membership should matter for labor market
outcomes. In particular, while fraternities make significant time demands — members must
spend considerable time picking up trash on highways, raising money for charitable causes,
and so on — these activities appear largely unrelated to skill development for future careers.
Nonetheless, fraternities draw many applicants who eagerly spend money and devote time
to these activities, and employers seem to weigh membership information positively.
We develop a theory of fraternity membership and filtering by firms that makes sense
of these observations. Students are distinguished by a fraternity socializing value and their
productivity as a worker. Fraternities value both the future wages generated by members
and their socializing values. Firms combine information in noisy signals about student pro-
ductivities with fraternity membership status to set wages. To emphasize the key economic
forces, we suppose that fraternity socializing values are not directly valued by firms and also
that they are uncorrelated with worker productivities. We further assume away all stan-
dard club features for fraternities as in Buchanan [1965], so that there are no consumption
spillovers due to the presence of other students. So, too, we assume away any networking
services that a fraternity might provide. As a result, the fraternity membership statuses of
other students only affect job market outcomes for a given student via the equilibrium beliefs
that firms form about the distribution of abilities of fraternity members and non-members.
We first identify sufficient conditions for fraternity membership not to matter for job mar-
ket outcomes. In particular, we show that if the signal that firms receive about a student’s
productivity is either perfectly informative or perfectly noisy, then equilibrium wages do not
depend on a student’s fraternity membership. As a result, whether a student rushes a fra-
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ternity depends only on his fraternity socializing value. If signals are perfectly informative,
fraternities trade off between productivity and socializing value in admission, but a student’s
wage will equal his known productivity, rendering membership irrelevant for labor market
outcomes. If, instead, signals are perfectly noisy, a fraternity would like to commit to exclud-
ing low ability students with high socializing value, and to accepting high ability students
with low socializing value. However, with perfectly noisy productivity signals, firms have no
source other than fraternity membership for evaluating a student’s ability, so that fraterni-
ties weigh only socializing values in admission. As a result, fraternity membership conveys
no information to firms about ability, so that wages do not hinge on fraternity membership.
In sum, we show that for fraternity membership to affect job market outcomes, firms
must receive signals about a student productivities that are noisy, but not perfectly so.
Then, because more productive students tend to earn higher wages, fraternities trade off
between productivity and fraternity socializing values when deciding which pledge applicants
to accept. In particular, fraternities accept students with low socializing values who are
sufficiently able. Students may face a different type of trade off—more able students may
incur a labor market cost from joining a fraternity, as their fraternity membership may
lump them in with intermediate quality students, making it harder for the able students
to distinguish themselves in the eyes of firms. In such a situation, sufficiently more able
students may be reluctant to pledge fraternities.
We then turn to a three-signal setting in which we can explicitly solve for the multiple
equilibria that emerge in the fraternity game. We identify three types of equilibria: (a) an
“empty fraternity” equilibrium in which no student applies to the fraternity, supported by
beliefs of firms that any student who joins the fraternity is especially lacking in ability; (b) a
“hump-shaped” equilibrium in which most fraternity members have intermediate abilities—
less able students apply, but are rejected unless they have high fraternity socializing values,
while very able students who do not have very high fraternity socializing values do not apply;
and (c) an equilibrium in which employer beliefs about the abilities of fraternity members
are more optimistic—so that fraternity membership would increase the expected wage of
each student type. In these latter two equilibria, relatively low ability students expect higher
wages if they gain fraternity membership than if they do not; while in the second equilibrium,
but not the third, higher ability students may anticipate lower wages if they join. That is, fra-
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ternity membership may taint labor market outcomes for high ability students, but not low.
We return to a more general signal framework, in which we only assume that the con-
ditional distribution of ability signals that firms receive satisfies the monotone likelihood
ratio property—more able students are more likely to generate higher signals. We then pro-
vide gross sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibria to have the hump-shaped feature.
In particular, these sufficient conditions imply that the wage premium due to fraternity
membership declines with ability—the lowest ability fraternity members always receive a
particularly large wage premium, as their membership ensures that they are separated away
from all lower ability types, and are mixed in with relatively higher proportions of more able
types, while high ability types gain less (or lose) from being mixed in with less able fraternity
members. The hump-shaped equilibrium then emerges, due to the filtering by fraternities of
low ability students, and, when membership costs are of an appropriate magnitude relative
to socializing values, the reluctance of high ability students to join.
Finally, we investigate whether equilibria of our three-signal model are consistent with
actual practice. To do this, we obtain data on cumulative GPAs of seniors at the Univer-
sity of Illinois for fraternity members and non-members. Using GPA as a noisy indicator
of ability, we find that the equilibrium in which most fraternity members have intermediate
abilities—where high ability students are tainted by membership in fraternities—can gener-
ate a distribution over probability of membership conditional on ability that closely mirrors
the distribution over the probability of fraternity membership conditional on GPA found in
the data. We back out plausible estimates of primitives—the time costs of fraternity par-
ticipation, and the tradeoffs of both students and fraternity between socializing values and
future wages. We use these estimates to derive how the presence of the fraternity affects the
welfare of different student types.
We next review the literature and then provide a brief overview of fraternities. In section
2 we develop our model and analysis. Section 3 considers a three signal setting. Section 4
returns to a general setting and provides sufficient conditions for all non-trivial equilibria to
exhibit the hump-shaped pattern that we find in the data. Section 5 provides our empirical
analysis of fraternities. Section 6 concludes. Some proofs are in an appendix.
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1.1 Related Literature
Our model and analysis can be integrated into the endogenous statistical discrimination lit-
erature. The closest papers are Moro and Norman [2004] and Austen-Smith and Fryer [2005].
Moro and Norman [2004] consider a setting in which individuals choose whether to make a
costly investment in education, when firms receive noisy signals of that investment.1 They
show how a productivity irrelevant aspect such as racial identity can affect investment choices
if firms believe that one population is more likely to invest.2 In particular, one can support
multiple equilibria, one where beliefs do not depend on race, and one where they do.3,4 So,
too, in our economy, the essence is how the beliefs of firms about the abilities of workers
who generate different signals are affected by the equilibrium fraternity membership status.
One difference between our economy and this literature is that fraternity membership in our
economy is not productivity enhancing, and uncertainty does not relate to whether or not
an investment was made. More importantly, race is exogenous, while fraternity membership
is endogenous; in particular, fraternity membership is not solely determined by the student,
but rather is the outcome of an admission game played by the fraternity and students.
Austen-Smith and Fryer [2005] consider a setting in which a “peer group” generates ad-
ditional utility from leisure for its members, and this drives members to shift time allocation
toward less education, which leads to lower wages. Those who are rejected by the peer group
study more, “acting white”.
1See also Coate and Loury [1993], Fang and Norman [2006] and Norman [2003] for related models.
2Fang [2001] considers a variant in which firms interpret participation in an irrelevant activity as a signal
that the agent has a low investment cost, and assign agents who signal to the job where such investment is
productive. By way of contrast, ours is not a signaling model (indeed, sufficiently higher ability students are
reluctant to join), and the information content of fraternity membership is determined by the equilibrium
interaction between the fraternity and different student types.
3We could augment our economy to have firm beliefs depend on race as well, with the result that race
will enter both the decision of whether to apply to a fraternity, and the decision by the fraternity of whether
to accept an applicant.
4Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked [2000] develop a related search model in which firms choose which
populations to search, and each population makes investments in skills based on beliefs about firm search
intensities. Again, asymmetric search intensities can give rise to asymmetric investment choices in two
otherwise identical populations.
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1.2 Fraternities and Sororities
To ease presentation, we drop gender differences and refer to both fraternities and sororities
as “fraternities”. The first club-like fraternity with a centralized organization, was Kappa
Alpha Society, founded in 1825. For a history and current status of fraternities, see Anson
and Marchesani [1991].
Fraternities require pledge applicants to submit extensive information about themselves:
their school GPA, recommendations, interests and useful skills. Fraternities devote far more
time to evaluating applicants than do potential employers. In particular, almost all fraternity
applicants are interviewed, and applicants take part in an extensive series of activities during
the evaluation process. For example, Sigma Chi requires a potential member to spend one
year working for the fraternity before the pledge. This suggests that fraternities are well-
situated to evaluate a pledge applicant’s ability, so that fraternity membership can provide
firms with valuable information.
Fraternities rely on membership fees and donations to fund activities. A substantial share
of a fraternity’s income comes from alumni donations. Because high income alumni donate
more, fraternities care about the future job market outcomes of members. An indication of
the value that fraternities place on productive members is that GPA-based stipends to frater-
nity members are widespread. Fraternities frequently reject pledge applicants. Conversely,
many highly-productive students choose not to apply to fraternities. Finally, students almost
never join more than one fraternity. This reflects both secrecy issues (secret handshakes, for
example, allow one member to verify the membership status of others), and because frater-
nity activities are quite time-consuming.
2 The Fraternity Game
There is a population of measure 1 of students. A student is fully described by his future
employment productivity θ and his fraternity socializing value, µ. Students have separable
preferences over income and fraternity membership: a non-member’s payoff corresponds to
his expected net lifetime income,M , and a fraternity member with socializing value µ derives
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utility
M + nµ,
where n > 0. M equals the student’s expected lifetime future wage minus the monetary
value c of the time costs of fraternity service activities. Note that to sever all links with the
club-good literature, we assume away any externalities from the socializing values of other
fraternity members. So, too, to ensure that there is no direct link between productivity
and membership, we assume that θ and µ are uncorrelated in the population. That is, the
density over θ and µ is given by
h (θ, µ) = hθ(θ)hµ(µ),
where the bounded supports of θ and µ are given by[θ, θ¯] and [µ, µ¯], respectively, and θ and µ¯
are both positive. The associated cdf is H , and the measure m, used in some proofs, is based
on H . We emphasize that while we believe that socializing skills and productivity may be
correlated in practice, we assume such correlation away in order to highlight the impact of
application decisions by students and filtering by fraternities on the equilibrium distribution
of abilities in the fraternity.5
There is a single representative fraternity that chooses which “rush” applicants to admit.
The fraternity cares about both the future market wages that its members will obtain, and
the socializing values of its members. For simplicity, we assume that the fraternity has
separable linear preferences over wages and socializing values, so that the fraternity’s payoff
from members (θ, µ) in the set C of fraternity members is given by∫
(θ,µ)∈C
[W1Eθ˜(wC(θ˜|θ)) +W2µ]h(θ, µ)dθdµ,
where W1 > 0 and W2 ≥ 0. We assume that the fraternity is limited by space constraints
to admitting at most a measure Γ of students: in practice, a fraternity house has a lim-
ited number of bedrooms. This means that the fraternity will tradeoff between µ and θ
in admission—trading off future higher contributions from more able and hence wealthier
alumni against their social contribution.
5Obviously, if social skills and productivity are positively correlated in the population, and the fraternity
values social skills, then this exogenous correlation will lead to fraternity members receiving higher wages
than non-members; we wanted to avoid building this result trivially into our model. We assume away any
network services that a fraternity might provide for the same reason.
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Our analysis is qualitatively unaffected by alternative preferences of the fraternity that
continue to induce the fraternity to tradeoff between socializing value and ability in admis-
sions. In particular, qualitatively identical outcomes obtain if the fraternity did not face a
space constraint, but instead cared about the average socializing value of its members (say
due to externalities), in addition to the future wages that members earn. So, too, outcomes
are qualitatively unaffected if the fraternity, rather than facing a space constraint, incurred
costs that were a convex function of the measure of members (say due to cramming more
students into each room), or if the fraternity cared about the market value of the time
contributions of its members.
After graduation, students are employed by firms. We assume that several risk-neutral
firms make simultaneous wage offers to students. The firms do not observe an individual
student’s productivity θ or fraternity socializing value µ. However, firms do observe whether
a student is a member of a fraternity. Firms also observe a common signal θ˜ about the
student’s productivity θ, where θ˜ is distributed according to Fθ˜ (·|θ). We assume that more
able students are more likely to generate higher signals: Fθ˜(θ˜|θ) is strictly decreasing in θ
for all (θ, θ˜) with Fθ˜(θ˜|θ) ∈ (0, 1). Competition drives firms to offer each individual a wage
equal to his expected productivity given his fraternity membership status and ability signal,
θ˜.
There are four stages to our “fraternity rush” game. At stage one, each student type (θ, µ)
decides whether to apply for fraternity membership. We let a(θ, µ) be an indicator function
taking on the value 1 if student type (θ, µ) applies, and taking on the value 0 if the student
type does not apply. We sometimes use the set A = {(θ, µ)|a(θ, µ) = 1}. At stage 2, the fra-
ternity chooses which applicants to accept. We let bA(θ, µ) be an indicator function taking on
the value 1 if, given the set of applicants A, the fraternity would admit a student type (θ, µ)
who applied, and taking on the value 0 otherwise. We use BA = {(θ, µ)|bA(θ, µ) = 1} to rep-
resent the set of admitted student types. Then, the set of fraternity member types is CA =
{(θ, µ)|a(θ, µ)bA(θ, µ) = 1}, and the set of nonmembers is C¯A = {(θ, µ)|a(θ, µ)bA(θ, µ) = 0}.
At stage 3, firms see whether an individual is a fraternity member, and they see a noisy
signal of his ability, but do not observe their types—firms must form beliefs about which
student types actually join the fraternity. Let ρF (θ, µ) denote firm beliefs about fraternity
membership for each type (θ, µ), where ρF (θ, µ) = 1 if firms believe type (θ, µ) is a member
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of the fraternity, and ρF (θ, µ) = 0 if not. Finally, wC(θ˜) denotes the wage of a fraternity
member who emits the signal θ˜, and wC(θ˜) denotes the wage of a non-member who generates
signal θ˜. At stage 4, a worker with productivity θ produces output with value θ.
An equilibrium is a collection of functions, {a(θ, µ), bA(θ, µ), wC(θ˜), wC(θ˜)} and firm
beliefs ρF (θ, µ) such that
i) Students optimize: a(θ, µ) = 1 if E[wC(θ˜)|θ] + nµ − c ≥ E[wC(θ˜)|θ]; 0 otherwise. We
let A∗ be the associated set of fraternity applicants.
ii) For every A the fraternity optimizes: BA solves
Problem 1
max
BA
∫
(θ,µ)∈A∩BA
[W1E[wC(θ˜)|θ] +W2µ]h(θ, µ)dθdµ (1)
subject to m(A ∩BA) ≤ Γ.
iii) wages are competitive given beliefs by firms ρF (θ, µ):
wC(θ˜) =
∫
C
θh(θ, µ)ρF (θ, µ)fθ˜(θ˜|θ)dθdµ∫
C
h (θ, µ) ρF (θ, µ) fθ˜(θ˜|θ)dθdµ
; wC(θ˜) =
∫
C
θh (θ, µ) (1− ρF (θ, µ))fθ˜(θ˜|θ)dθdµ∫
C
h (θ, µ) (1− ρF (θ, µ)) fθ˜(θ˜|θ)dθdµ
.
iv) Firm beliefs are consistent with choices of student types and fraternity: For a.e. (θ, µ),
ρF (θ, µ) = a(θ, µ)bA∗ (θ, µ).
Off-equilibrium path characterizations are not intrinsically interesting, and to ease presen-
tation, we only characterize equilibrium path outcomes. Moreover, measure zero perturba-
tions of the fraternity’s acceptance set BA∗ are uninteresting—any measure zero perturbation
to BA∗ is also part of an equilibrium, so we focus on a best response of the fraternity that is
a good set, i.e., a set BA∗ that is equal to the closure of its own interior. Finally, to simplify
notation, we omit the A∗ index on the equilibrium acceptance set.
We begin by providing conditions under which fraternity membership has no effect on
labor market outcomes.
Proposition 1 Suppose that firms either receive perfect signals about students, i.e. θ˜ = θ,
a.e., θ, or firms receive perfectly uninformative signals, Fθ˜(·|θ) = Fθ˜(·|θ
′), for all θ, θ′. Then,
in equilibrium, a student’s wage does not depend on whether he is in the fraternity or not,
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i.e., wC(θ˜) = wC(θ˜), for all θ˜. Hence, a student type (θ, µ) applies for membership in the
fraternity if and only if nµ− c ≥ 0.
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Figure 1: Perfect signaling equilibrium.
Suppose signaling is perfect. Then wC(θ˜) = wC¯(θ˜) = θ˜ = θ (a.e.). Optimization by stu-
dents then implies that a student type (θ, µ) applies if and only if nµ− c ≥ 0, independently
of θ. In contrast to students, the fraternity selectively admits higher θ applicants who will
earn higher wages. In particular, the fraternity trades off between µ and θ in admission; let-
ting µB(θ) denote the boundary of the admission set, indifference implies that the boundary
has slope dµB(θ)
dθ
= −W1
W2
. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium. The solid line is the fraternity’s
equilibrium cutoff rule—all types to the right of the line who apply are accepted, while all
those to the left are rejected. The vertical dashed line represents the accept-or-reject line
of students—student types to the right apply in equilibrium, i.e., are in the set A. Hence,
the equilibrium set C of fraternity members consists of those types to the right of both the
dashed and solid lines, and the measure of the set C is at most Γ.
If, instead, signals are completely uninformative, then all individuals receive the same
wage, wC(θ˜) = wC¯(θ˜) = E[θ]. A fraternity would like to commit to excluding low θ stu-
dents with high socializing values µ, and to accepting high θ students with low socializing
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values. However, since firms have no source other than fraternity membership for evaluating
a student’s ability, all fraternity members must receive the same wage. But then, given any
beliefs that firms hold about the abilities of fraternity members, the fraternity’s optimal
admission policy only depends on µ, admitting a type (θ, µ) if and only if µ exceeds some
critical cutoff. Hence, fraternity membership conveys no information to firms about θ. As a
result, in equilibrium, both fraternity and non-fraternity members receive wage E[θ]. Since
wages do not depend on membership, it follows that only students with nµ ≥ c apply. Figure
2 illustrates this uninformative signal case.
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Types that do not
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Figure 2: Contentless signaling equilibrium.
Although we do not explore it further, the case of completely uninformative signals about
abilities highlights the gains that fraternities may achieve from an ability to commit to their
admission policies. In particular, the fraternity would like to commit to excluding low ability
students who have moderately high socializing values, and to accepting high ability students
with lower socializing values. In practice, imperfect commitment devises that fraternities use
include having university officials report the average GPA of members, and having the Greek
council forbid fraternity participation to students with GPAs below some standard. This
commitment induces a fraternity to weigh ability in admission, raising wages of members,
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and thereby raising the fraternity’s payoff.
The central implication of Proposition 1 is that for fraternity membership to affect job
market outcomes, firms must receive signals about student productivities that are noisy, but
not perfectly so. Then, because more productive students tend to earn higher wages, fra-
ternities value both productivity and fraternity socializing value, and will tradeoff between
the two in admission. We now examine the choice problems of students and the fraternity
in more detail.
2.1 Student’s Problem
Students compare the expected payoffs from being a fraternity member and not, taking
into account both the consequences for expected wages, and his fraternity socializing value.
Optimization implies that a student type (θ, µ) applies for fraternity membership if and only
if
Eθ˜
[
wC(θ˜)|θ
]
+ nµ − c ≥ Eθ˜
[
wC(θ˜)|θ
]
. (2)
That is, a student applies to the fraternity either to obtain higher expected wages, or be-
cause his fraternity socializing value µ is sufficiently high.6 The following result follows
straightforwardly.
Proposition 2 If a(θ, µ) = 1, then a(θ, µ′) = 1, for all µ′ > µ.
Proof. The expected wages of individuals (θ, µ) and (θ, µ′) are the same, but a type (θ, µ′)
student gains strictly more utility from joining the membership.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium supply of fraternity applicants is summarized by a continuous
function µA(θ) such that a type (θ, µ) student applies if and only if µ ≥ µA(θ).
Proof. The result follows because expected wages of fraternity and non-fraternity members
are continuous in θ. Therefore, student payoffs and hence choices are continuous in expected
wages.
6If (2) holds, then student type (θ, µ) applies even if he expects to be rejected by the fraternity. If
students face positive costs of applying, then to reconcile the observation that some students apply, but
are not admitted, one must integrate additional uncertainty/noise, so that a student does not always know
whether he or she will be admitted. Such uncertainty complicates presentation and analysis, while providing
limited benefits. Accordingly, we abstract away.
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2.2 Fraternity’s Problem
In any equilibrium, the fraternity offers membership to the set of students B that solves
Problem 1. The sets A and B implicitly define the set of fraternity members C = A∩B and
the set of nonmembers C. Since the fraternity’s payoff is increasing in the socializing values
of its members, we have
Proposition 3 For almost all (µ, θ) in A
⋂
B, almost all types (θ, µ′) with µ′ > µ also
belong to B.
Proof. See the appendix.
We next show that we can extend this characterization to establish that the fraternity
also wants to admit students who are more able as long as expected wages are increasing
in θ; and expected wages are increasing in θ if wC(θ˜) is increasing in θ˜. As a preliminary
step, we present an implication of the MLRP property on signals (see Milgrom [1981]) for
equilibrium wages.
Lemma 1 Assume that f(θ|θ˜) > 0 on [θ, θ¯], and that f(θ|x) satisfies the MLRP property.
Fix a set D ⊂ Θ × Θ˜ with P (θ˜ = k|θ˜ ∈ D) < 1 for all signals k. Let Q(θ˜) = E(θ|θ˜, D) be
a firm’s estimate of ability given signal θ˜ and set D. Then from the perspective of a student
with ability θ, his expected wage Eθ˜[Q(θ˜)|θ,D], increases with his ability θ.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the signals that firms receive about student abilities have the
MLRP property. Then for almost all (θ, µ) if b(θ, µ) = 1, we have b(θ′, µ) = 1 for almost all
θ′ > θ.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the expected wage Eθ˜[wC(θ˜)|θ] is an increasing function of θ. The
logical construction of Proposition 3 then applies.
Propositions 3 and 4 pin down the attributes of the set B of student types that the fra-
ternity would admit. For example, if every student whom the fraternity would want to admit
applies, then B is defined by a negatively-sloped curve in (θ, µ) space, µB(θ): The fraternity
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Figure 3: Unconstrained admissions set B.
admits almost every student type above (Proposition 4) and to the right (Proposition 3) of
this curve (see Figure 3), i.e., B = {(θ, µ)|µ ≥ µB(θ)}, and C = A
⋂
B. Both µA(θ) and
µB(θ) are continuous in θ, reflecting the continuity of expected wages in θ.
More generally, for almost all θ where the fraternity’s admission decision is not con-
strained by student application, i.e., for almost all θ with µB(θ) > µA(θ), the fraternity
trades off linearly between expected wage and fraternity socializing value in admission. That
is, for θ1, θ2 with µB(θj) > µA(θj), j = 1, 2, we have
W1E(wC(θ˜)|θ1) +W2µ(θ1) =W1E(wC(θ˜)|θ2) +W2µ(θ2).
That is, marginal contributions of these marginal types, (θ1, µB(θ1)) and (θ2, µB(θ2)) are
equal.7
2.3 Existence of equilibrium
We first characterize when the “empty fraternity” is an equilibrium. In this “Groucho Marx”
equilibrium, the fraternity would accept anyone who applies, but no one applies because firms
7This result extends if we relax the structure on the fraternity’s preferences, so that preferences over aggre-
gate wages and socializing values are non-linear, W (m(EwC(θ˜)),m(µ|C)). Then, the appropriate marginal
derivatives, W1,W2, evaluated at the aggregates, describe the indifference relationship for the fraternity.
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believe that anyone who joins the fraternity has low ability θ and hence would be given wage
wC(θ˜) = θ. If no one joins the fraternity, then someone who generates signal θ˜ receives
wage wC¯(θ˜) = E[θ|θ˜]. Let w = Eθ˜[wC¯(θ˜)|θ] be the wage that a student with lowest ability θ
expects if he does not join the fraternity in this scenario.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the signaling technology has a full support property, f(θ|x) >
0, ∀x. Then an equilibrium exists with A = C = ∅ if and only if nµ¯− c ≤ w − θ.
Proof. See the appendix.
If nµ¯ − c ≤ w − θ, then pessimistic firm beliefs can support the empty fraternity equi-
librium. However, if the inequality does not hold, then sufficiently inept students with high
socializing values would prefer to join the fraternity because they also expect to receive low
enough wages outside the fraternity that the maximum wage cost from joining the fraternity
is more than offset by their high socializing values.
We next prove that an equilibrium always exists to this fraternity game, establishing a
fixed point to a mapping from conjectured optimal student application and fraternity admis-
sion choices by firms to the best responses to those conjectures by students and fraternities.
To do so, we exploit Propositions 2 and 4 and consider continuous student and fraternity
choice functions µA(·) and µB(·), where a student type (θ, µ) is a member of the fraternity
if and only if µ ≥ max{µA(θ), µB(θ)}. Existence of equilibrium then follows from standard
fixed point theorems.
Proposition 6 An equilibrium exists to the fraternity game.
Proof. See the appendix.
3 Three Signal Economy
To gain explicit insight into the equilibria of this fraternity game, we next consider an
economy in which student productivities and fraternity socializing values are uniformly dis-
tributed on the unit square, i.e., (θ, µ) are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]×[0; 1], and students
generate one of three possible signals, θ˜ ∈ {H,M,L}. In particular, we suppose that more
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able students with θ > 0.5 generate either medium or high signals, where the probability of a
high signal is linearly increasing in ability; and that less able students with θ < 0.5 generate
either low or medium signals:
Prob (H|θ) = 2θ − 1, θ >
1
2
and 0 otherwise.
Prob (L|θ) = 1− 2θ, θ <
1
2
and 0 otherwise.
Prob (M |θ) = 1− Prob (L|θ)− Prob (H|θ) .
This signal technology obviously satisfies the MLRP property. Its central feature is that
a student with θ < 0.5 hopes to get lucky and receive a medium signal, and thereby be
indistinguishable from a student with θ > 0.5 who unluckily receives a medium signal.
Let wC(θ˜) be the wage that a fraternity member who generates signal θ˜ receives and
wC¯(θ˜) be the wage that a non-member who generates signal θ˜. The expected wage of a
student with ability θ who joins the fraternity is
E
(
wC
(
θ˜
)
|θ
)
= wC (H)Prob (H|θ) + wC (M)Prob (M |θ) + wC (L)Prob (L|θ) .
An analogous expression describes wages of students who are not fraternity members.
The piecewise linear structure of the signaling technology implies that the expected wage
functions are piecewise linear in θ with a single kink at θ = 1
2
. It follows that the boundary
describing the set of students that the fraternity would admit, where not limited by students’
application decisions, is also linear with a kink at θ = 1
2
. Since the difference in wages of
fraternity members and non-members is linear with a kink at θ = 1
2
, the boundary of the set
of applicants to the fraternity, µA (θ), is also linear with a kink at θ =
1
2
. Therefore, the set of
fraternity members, {(µ, θ)|µ ≥ max{µA(θ), µB(θ)}}, is described by a continuous piecewise-
linear function from [0, 1] to [0, 1] that has one or two kinks, where one kink is at θ = 0.5,
and the other (if it exists) is at the intersection of the fraternity and student cutoff rules.
One equilibrium is obviously the “empty fraternity”, but there are also more interesting
equilibria. In particular, given Γ, we search for (i) an equilibrium in which the boundary
µA(θ) of A is everywhere to the left of the boundary µB(θ) of B, i.e., where every student
that the fraternity would want is admitted and (ii) an equilibrium in which µA(θ) and µB(θ)
intersect, so the piecewise-linear function describing the frontier of the set of fraternity mem-
bers has two kinks. This latter equilibrium is described by a system with thirteen unknowns
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(the slope and intercepts of the three lines plus the intersection point of the student and fra-
ternity frontier, plus six wages) and thirteen equations (6 equations from the firm’s problem
— wages equal expected skill given signal realization and membership status, 4 equations
from the fraternity and 3 equations from the students). We solve this system numerically
for the associated equilibrium outcome, when it exists.
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Figure 4: Application-unconstrained equilibrium.
In our base parameterization, student utilities are M + nµ, with n = 0.18, student time
costs of participating in the fraternity are c = 0.09, the fraternity trades off between wages
and socializing value according to W1
W2
= 1.1, and the fraternity’s capacity is Γ = 0.35. Figure
4 illustrates the unique “application-unconstrained” equilibrium. In this equilibrium firms
have optimistic beliefs about the productivities of fraternity members, so that given any
signal emitted by a student, his wage is higher if he is a member of a fraternity than if he
is a non-member. As a result, in this equilibrium every student whom the fraternity would
like to admit chooses to apply—and, indeed, because wC(H) = 0.8480 > wC(H) = 0.8143,
only very productive people with especially low socializing values choose not to apply (and
while less productive students apply, most are rejected).
However, for exactly the same parameterization, there is also an “application constrained”
equilibrium in which some students whom the fraternity would like to admit do not apply.
16
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
µ
θ
Fraternity members
Want to join the club, but
are not accepted
Desired by fraternity, but don’t apply
Figure 5: Application constrained fraternity game equilibrium.
Figure 5 depicts this equilibrium: the solid line denotes the fraternity’s cutoff rule, and
dashed line denotes locus of students who are indifferent between joining the fraternity and
not. In this equilibrium, firms hold more pessimistic beliefs about the abilities of fraternity
members, so that higher ability students are more reluctant to join the fraternity. Inter-
mediate quality students remain eager to join, and the fraternity’s composition is radically
shifted to reflect this population. Comparing the fraternity’s cutoff line in Figure 4 with that
in Figure 5 reveals that the fraternity is less “picky” when its choice set is constrained by
the reluctance of able students to apply. Because able types θ = 1 expect lower wages inside
the fraternity than out, wC(H) = 0.7940 < wC¯(H) = 0.8555, the fraternity attracts only a
small fraction of able students, and the bulk of its members have intermediate abilities.
Figure 6 presents the expected wage that a student with ability θ would receive as a fra-
ternity member and non-member for these two equilibria. Notice the crossing of wages in the
application-constrained equilibrium. This reflects that while all lower ability student receive
higher wages as fraternity members, higher θ students in the application-constrained equi-
librium accept a direct loss in wage by joining the fraternity, for which they are compensated
by high socializing values.
Note that in the application-unconstrained equilibrium, were we to increase Γ slightly,
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Wages. The solid line is the expected wage of a fraternity member
(as a function of θ), and the dashed line is the expected wage of a nonmember.
then all existing members of the fraternity would still apply, and the fraternity’s payoff would
be increased. This observation implies that were we to replace the fraternity’s capacity con-
straint with a strictly convex cost function of admitting more members, the fraternity would
admit more members when beliefs of firms about member abilities are optimistic, thereby
encouraging able students to apply.
Figure 7 reveals how the fraternity’s capacity affects equilibrium outcomes. Interest-
ingly, raising capacity can raise the wages of able fraternity members. Essentially, when
Γ is increased, the mix of students that the fraternity admits shifts slightly toward more
able students with lower socializing values, i.e., toward students with higher θs and lower
values of µ. But this raises the expected wages of able students who join the fraternity. But
then, able students are more willing to join—there is a significant increase in the measure of
able students who apply to the fraternity. Notice also that as Γ increases, the slope of the
boundary characterizing the application decision of less able students with θ ∈ [0, 1
2
] changes.
This result reflects a change in the relative slope of wage functions: when, among students
with θ ∈ [0, 1
2
], most of those with relatively high productivities are in the fraternity, then
receiving the signal M and being outside the fraternity has a smaller premium than being
in the fraternity and getting signal M (relative to receiving signal L in both cases).
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4 Hump-Shaped Equilibria
Our three-signal setting shows that one possible equilibrium fraternity composition (see e.g.,
Figure 5) is where membership is “hump-shaped” in student ability. Empirically (see Figure
8), we will see that conditioning on student ability, among sufficiently able students, the
percentage who are members is a declining function of ability. This makes it important to
understand when and how the hump-shaped equilibrium emerges in a more general setting,
and, in particular, to ensure that it is not the three-signal setting that underlies the hump-
shaped outcome. Accordingly, we now identify sufficient conditions under which the hump-
shape is a characteristic of the fraternity equilibrium.
We say that an equilibrium set of fraternity members is hump-shaped if:
1. A ∩ B 6= B and A ∩B 6= ∅.
2. The students’ acceptance threshold µA(θ) is increasing in θ for (θ, µA(θ)) ∈ B.
The first condition says that there are students who would be accepted by the fraternity,
(θ, µ) ∈ B, but choose not to apply. When the fraternity only values the future wages of its
19
members, the first condition always holds as long as the costs c of joining are neither too
small (possibly negative) that even the students with the lowest socializing values want to
join, nor so large that even the students with the highest socializing values do not want to
join. When the fraternity also values the socializing values of its members by enough that
it does not accept the most able student with the least socializing value, then the necessary
lower bound on c is higher.
We begin by showing that if the wage premium from membership in the fraternity falls
with higher signals (recall, for example, Figure 6), then more able students are more reluctant
to join the fraternity.
Lemma 2 If wC(θ˜) − wC¯(θ˜) is a decreasing function of θ˜ then the students’ acceptance
threshold µA(θ) is an increasing function of θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We next establish conditions under which the hump-shaped equilibrium emerges when the
fraternity only cares about the wages of its members, and not their socializing values. Then,
it follows that the fraternity admits every students whose ability exceeds some cutoff, θ0, and
further that as capacity Γ falls, θ0 rises. We make two weak assumptions. The first is tech-
nical in nature, and the second says that the cost of membership is such that students with
the highest socializing value want to join, but those with the lowest socializing value do not.
Assumption 1 Either the support for signals θ˜ is finite, or the support of fθ˜(θ˜|θ¯) is non-
trivial.
Assumption 2 Suppose that the cost c of joining the fraternity satisfies
nµ+ θ¯ − E[θ] < c < nµ¯+ θ¯ − E[θ].
Proposition 7 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and the fraternity does not care
about the socializing values of its members. Then when the fraternity is small enough, the
equilibrium is hump-shaped. That is, there exists a Γ > 0, such that for all Γ < Γ, any
non-trivial equilibrium is hump-shaped.
20
Proof. See the appendix.
The role of Γ¯ is to provide a gross sufficient condition for a declining wage premium for
fraternity membership—it ensures that the fraternity is sufficiently picky. The lowest ability
fraternity members always receive a large wage premium, as their membership ensures that
they are separated away from all lower ability types, and are mixed in with relatively higher
proportions of more able types. The smaller is Γ, the higher is the wage premium for a given
low ability type, due to the increased filtering out of lower ability students by the fraternity.
High ability types gain less, because they only benefit from separation from low ability non-
members, whom they may be unlikely to be confused with (as they are unlikely to generate
the signals sent by low ability students), and fraternity membership lumps them in with inter-
mediate ability students. When costs of membership are of an appropriate magnitude, they
cause higher ability students to become increasingly reluctant to join, giving rise to the hump-
shaped equilibrium. That is, the fraternity’s filtering eliminates higher proportions of lower
ability students, while on the high ability end, increasing proportions of higher and higher
ability students choose not to join to avoid the increasing wage “penalty” for membership.
The logic of the proof of Proposition 7 extends immediately to settings where the fra-
ternity cares about socializing values, so that µB(θ) is a decreasing function of θ, but not
so much that µB(θ¯) < µ. As the weight W2 that the fraternity places on socializing values
increases, the analysis follows directly, albeit inelegantly, if we replace Assumption 2 with
an assumption that we write implicitly in terms of equilibrium values:
Assumption 3 Suppose that the cost c of joining the fraternity satisfies
nµB(θ¯) + θ¯ −E[θ] < c < nµ¯+ θ¯ − E[θ].
In essence, if the fraternity places a sufficient weight on socializing values, it will not
admit high ability students who have low socializing values, so it may already be filtering
out the set of high ability students who are reluctant to join. As a result, a higher cost of
membership may be required to support a hump-shaped equilibrium.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the fraternity places a positive weight on both socializing values
and wages (W1,W2 > 0). Then when Assumptions 1 and 3 hold and the fraternity is small
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enough, the equilibrium is hump-shaped. That is, there exists a Γ > 0, such that for all
Γ < Γ, any non-trivial equilibrium is hump-shaped.
Proof. The argument follows directly along the lines of the proof of Proposition 7, with
the added structure on c guaranteeing that µ¯ > µA(θ¯) > µB(θ¯).
Summing up, the hump-shaped nature of the equilibrium is generated not by any par-
ticular specification of the signal structure that must be imposed to solve explicitly for
equilibrium. Rather, the hump-shaped property derives only from the monotone likelihood
property of the distribution of signals that firms receive about students combined with the
conflicting interests of students and the fraternity that necessarily emerges whenever the
fraternity is sufficiently selective and membership is costly.
• The monotone likelihood ratio property means that when the fraternity filters out low
ability students, it is lower ability student types who gain more from fraternity mem-
bership, as most people who would generate low signals are rejected by the fraternity.
• The filtering out of low ability students by the fraternity, combined with the frater-
nity’s trade off between future earnings and socializing values, initially leads to student
participation in the fraternity being an increasing function of ability (for low θ types).
• The MLRP signal structure implies that higher and higher ability students gain less
and less, or are even hurt in terms of wages by fraternity membership due to mixing in
with less able students; and a cost-benefit calculation eventually causes higher ability
students to become increasingly reluctant to join. This implies that when Γ is small,
student participation in the fraternity eventually declines in ability.
5 Empirical Analysis
To see whether our model can reconcile the actual application and selection process of fra-
ternities, we obtained data on the cumulative GPAs of the 8634 seniors at the University of
Illinois in the fall semester of 2007 (excluding international students on temporary visas),
and a random sampling of 701 seniors who were fraternity or sorority members. GPAs only
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Figure 8: Conditional Distributions of GPAs
Notes: The dashed line is the conditional probability that a student is a fraternity member
given his or her GPA (rounded to the nearest 0.2). The thin line graphs the distribution of GPAs
for 701 seniors who are fraternity members (fall 2007), and the thick line graphs the probability
distribution for all 8634 seniors at the University of Illinois (fall 2007). The bars indicate 2
standard deviation confidence intervals.
reflect courses taken at the University of Illinois (i.e., omitting transferred courses), but the
senior classification is based on all hours accumulated prior to the end of the fall, 2007 term.
Figure 8 presents the conditional probability that a student is a member of a fraternity
given his or her GPA. Figure 8 reveals that the conditional probability that a student with a
low GPA of 2.0 is a fraternity member is less than 0.05, but that this probability more than
triples for intermediate GPAs between 3 and 3.4, before falling by more than a third for stu-
dents with high GPAs. Interpreting a student’s GPA as a noisy indicator of his or her ability,
this inverted U-shaped pattern is precisely what emerges in the equilibrium to our fraternity
game where able students are reluctant to join fraternities to avoid being tainted in labor mar-
ket outcomes, while intermediate and less able students are eager to join, and the fraternity
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screens out most of the less able students, i.e., those who do not have high socializing values.
This finding suggests that it is plausible to estimate our three-signal model formally, and
to extract the implications of our structural estimates for student welfare. We illustrate our
model’s potential by exploiting our limited data on grades and fraternity membership as far
as possible. To be consistent with the premises of our three-signal model, we assume that θ
corresponds to the quantile of the GPA distribution so that θ is distributed uniformly; and
that fraternity-socializing values, µ, are independently and uniformly distributed. Fixing
ability, our model indicates that fraternities admit higher µ types, allowing us to estimate
1 − µ(θ). In particular, letting Φ be the event that a randomly-selected person is in the
fraternity, the fraction of students with ability θ who are in the fraternity is
1−max(µA(θ), µB(θ)) = P (Φ|θ) = Pr(Φ)
fθ(θ|Φ)
fθ(θ)
,
where µA(θ) and µB(θ) are the cutoff rules of students and fraternity, fθ(·) is the density of
θ, and Pr(Φ) is the probability that a randomly-selected senior is a member of the fraternity.
Our estimate of Pr(Φ) is 1345
8634
, the number of senior fraternity members divided by the
number of seniors. To estimate fθ(·) we use the sample of all senior students with GPAs
of at least 2,8 and we use the sample of fraternity members’ GPAs exceeding 2 to estimate
fθ(·|Φ).
9 The densities are estimated using a kernel estimator, and we use them to smooth
the conditional probability of being in the fraternity conditional on GPA (the dashed line in
Figure 8). We then take 20 equally spaced θs between 0.05 and 0.95 as our pseudosample,
and evaluate µˆ(θ) = max(µA(θ), µB(θ)) from our smoothed conditional probability estimator
at these points. They are represented by dots in Figure 9.
The boundary in our model describing the set of fraternity members is piecewise linear
with two kinks, one at θ = 0.5, and another that we estimate. We first do this non-
structurally, simply finding the slopes and intercepts of the three line segments, and the
second kink position by minimizing the SSE, without imposing the equilibrium consistency
requirements (i.e., consistency of firm’s beliefs over the distribution of fraternity member
8We drop the few students with GPAs below 2, as they are subject to screening by the University (and,
indeed, only students with GPAs of at least 2 can graduate).
9We caution that in this exercise, we are treating GPA as ability, rather than as a noisy signal of ability;
however, since we aggregate individual observations and only use the aggregate distribution in our estimation,
it follows that estimates are qualitatively unaffected if the distribution of noisy signals closely corresponds
to the true distribution of ability.
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types with the set of fraternity members implied by the estimates). To do this, we use a
two-step estimation procedure to estimate the kink. We first take a possible kink value as
given, and find the slopes of the cut-off rules that minimize the SSE; our estimate of the
kink location minimizes the SSE overall.
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Figure 9: Estimated Unconstrained Model and Structural Model Fits
Next, we contrast this non-structural estimate with that obtained when we penalize cut-
off rules that are inconsistent with equilibrium. Direct structural estimation is complicated
by the extreme nonlinearity of the equilibrium requirement. This leads us to adopt a lasso-
type estimation approach, in which we minimize the residual sum of squares plus a quadratic
measure of the distance from the equilibrium. In equilibrium, W1
W2
= b1
2(wC(M)−wC(L))
=
b2
2(wC(H)−wC(M))
, where b1 is the slope of the club’s cutoff rule below θ = 0.5, and b2 is
the slope for θ > 0.5. We use the penalty function
10 [b1(wC(H)− wC(M))− b2(wC(M)− wC(L))]
2
.
The first panel of Figure 9 presents the estimated cut-off rules from unconstrained esti-
mation approach. This fit is far from an equilibrium; most obviously, the cut-off rule for the
club is not a monotonically decreasing function of θ. The panel on the right presents the
estimated cut-off rules from the penalized estimation approach. The value of the penalty is
less than 10−10, indicating that the estimated model is very close to an equilibrium model.
An F-test10 indicates that the differences between the structural and non-structural models
are not statistically significant.
10The F-value is 2.93, (1,13) degrees of freedom, p-value of 0.11; we are omitting considerations of the
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The penalized estimation approach implies estimates of the primitives for students: the
cost c is 0.23, or about 46% of the unconditional expected wage, and the fraternity socializ-
ing parameter is n = 0.28. We bootstrap the estimator to obtain 95% confidence intervals.
While the confidence intervals for n and c are wide ( [0.11, 0.52] and [0.08, 0.44], respectively),
the fraction c
n
= 0.82 has a tight 95% confidence interval of [0.73, 0.84]; and it is this ratio
that determines whether a student gains a net utility benefit from joining the fraternity in
a full information setting where firms know a student’s ability. Figure 9 shows that most
fraternity members are above this threshold, i.e., most fraternity members have socializing
values of µ > c
n
≈ 0.82. Thus, relative to a full information setting, the wage-setting mech-
anism impedes the efficiency of club participation: there are too many fraternity members
with intermediate abilities and too few low and high ability students with high socializing
values. Our estimate of the club’s relative weighting on member wages versus socializing
values, W1
W2
of 0.22 has a wide confidence interval of [0.06, 0.33], but the fraternity’s capacity
is precisely estimated (95% confidence interval of [15.44%, 15.76%]).
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Figure 10: Impact of Fraternity on Student Welfare
Our estimates allow us to explore how the presence of the fraternity affects the welfare of
non-normality of errors and the nonlinearity of both the model and restrictions. The asymptotic distribution
of this test is χ2(1), with a p-value of 0.08.
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Figure 11: Impact of Fraternity’s Wage Redistribution on Student Welfare
different student types. Figure 10 presents welfare gains and losses of different student types
relative to a setting in which there is no fraternity [or equivalently relative to the “empty”
fraternity equilibrium]. The solid line divides the population of student types into those
who benefit and those who are hurt, and the darker is the shade in the figure, the more
the fraternity’s presence hurts/benefits less a student. The figure reveals that all fraternity
members actually are made better off by the presence of the fraternity, gaining from the
socializing values of fraternity membership. In addition, able types, θ > 0.61 who are not
members gain because they receive higher market wages—firms believe that most highly
productive types do not join the fraternity.
Figure 11 contrasts student welfare in the equilibrium with that which obtains when
firms ignore the information in fraternity membership, or equivalently where the fraternity
does not have better information about θ than firms, and hence only weighs socializing
values in admission. Two groups of student types benefit when the fraternity weighs both
expected wage/ability and socializing values in admission: (i) low ability types with high
enough socializing values that they are admitted benefit from wage gain associated with
being mixed in with more able types; and (ii) high ability types with lower socializing
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values who do not join benefit from the higher wages due to the partial separation from
mediocre ability types generated by the fraternity admission process. Low ability types with
moderately high socializing values are hurt the most, as they both would gain socializing
values were the fraternity not to weigh ability, and they are punished by lower wages due to
their exclusion. The other group hurt consists of high ability/high socializing value students
who join in both environments, but are tarred by association with lesser types when the
fraternity weighs ability in admission, and therefore receive lower wages.
One should recognize caveats with our empirical analysis. In particular, one would like
better measures of ability. For example, an alternative explanation of the empirical rela-
tionship between GPA and fraternity membership that we document is that not only does
ability influence GPAs, but so does fraternity membership—fraternity cheat sheets may help
low ability students, but a fraternity party environment may make it difficult for high ability
students to study. Ideally, one would obtain measures of ability such as high school grade or
ACT scores that are not affected by fraternity membership. We also note that to show that
the ability distribution in the fraternity that we obtain theoretically is not driven by direct
factors, we assume that firms do not value fraternity socializing values and that socializing
values are uncorrelated with ability. Still, our empirical finding that high GPA students are
reluctant to join fraternities indicates that, in practice, firms cannot value those skills by too
much, and that the correlation between ability and socializing value cannot be too high.
6 Conclusion
On first impression, it is not clear why fraternity or sorority membership should matter for
labor market outcomes—fraternity activities seem to have little to do with skill development
for future careers. Nonetheless, resumes regularly highlight fraternity membership, suggest-
ing that membership augments the other signals that employers use to evaluate a person’s
productivity. Our paper provides insights into when fraternity membership matters for la-
bor market outcomes. We first show that if firms can either evaluate student productivities
perfectly, or are completely incapable of screening job applicants, then fraternity member-
ship has no impact on labor market outcomes. Otherwise, fraternity membership matters.
In particular, we identify two equilibria in which fraternity membership is valued by some
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students for labor market outcomes. In one equilibrium, optimistic beliefs by firms about
the abilities of fraternity members lead to higher wages for fraternity members than non-
members. As a result, everyone whom the fraternity would like to admit chooses to pledge.
We also identify an equilibrium in which able students are harmed in the labor market by
fraternity membership, but less able students benefit. In this equilibrium, most fraternity
members have intermediate abilities: less able students apply, hoping to be mixed in with
better students, but are rejected unless they have high fraternity socializing values, while
very able students who lack high socializing values do not apply to avoid being tainted in
labor market outcomes due to being mixed in with less able fraternity members. We find
that this latter equilibrium can reconcile the qualitative features of the ability distributions
of fraternity members and non-members at the University of Illinois.
While we pose our analysis in the context of fraternities, the central economic story ex-
tends with some variations to filtering by other organizations. For example, ROTC (reserve
officer training corps) may value both intellectual ability and leadership skills that firms
value, but also physical fitness that does not contribute productively in many occupations.
As a result, even were ROTC not to directly build skills of its officers, our model indicates that
firms may rationally weigh ROTC membership positively in their evaluations of job-seekers.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: First observe that in light of Proposition 2, if (θ, µ) applies to
the fraternity in equilibrium, then so does (θ, µ′). Suppose the proposition were false. Then
for ε > 0, sufficiently small, the set
Θε = {θ|∃zθ :
∫ zθ
−∞
a(θ, x)b(θ, x)hµ(x)dx > ε,
∫ +∞
zθ
(1− b(θ, x)) hµ(x)dx > ε}
has positive measure, i.e., there exists δ > 0 such that
∫
Θε
hθ(x)dx > δ. For every θ in Θε
pick a set of K = {(θ, µ)|µ < zθ, a(µ, θ)b(µ, θ) = 1} and L = {(θ, µ)|µ > zθ, b(µ, θ) = 0} such
that
∫
K
a(θ, µ)b(θ, µ)hµ(x)dx =
∫
L
a(θ, µ)(1 − b(θ, µ))hµ(x)dx = ε. But then the fraternity
decision rule
bˆ(θ, µ) = b(θ, µ)(1− I((θ, µ) ∈ K)) + I((θ, µ) ∈ L)
strictly raises the fraternity’s payoff as E(µ|K) < E(µ|L) and the expected wages gener-
ated by members and fraternity size are unchanged. Therefore, b could not have been an
equilibrium strategy for the fraternity. 
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider two signals, x > y ∈ Θ˜, and two productivities, θ2 > θ1 ∈ Θ,
such that (x, θ1), (x, θ2) and (y, θ2) ∈ D. By the MLRP property,
f(θ2|x)
f(θ1|x)
>
f(θ2|y)
f(θ1|y)
.
Notice that for every (j, k) ∈ D, f(j|k,D) = f(j|k)I((j,k)∈D)∫
Θ
I((θ,θ˜)∈D)dF (θ|θ˜)
= f(j|k) I((j,k)∈D)
P (D)
. Rewrite
the MLRP condition:
f(θ2|x,D)
f(θ1|x,D)
=
f(θ2|x)I((θ2,x)∈D)
P (D)
f(θ1|x)I((θ1,x)∈D)
P (D)
=
f(θ2|x)1
P (D)
f(θ1|x)1
P (D)
>
f(θ2|y)1
P (D)
f(θ1|y)1
P (D)
≥
f(θ2|y)I((θ2,y)∈D)
P (D)
f(θ1|y)I((θ1,y)∈D)
P (D)
=
f(θ2|y,D)
f(θ1|y,D)
.
Therefore, if the MLRP condition holds for the entire support, it holds for a subset D of
that support. This condition ensures that E(θ|θ˜, D) is an increasing function of θ˜. By
F (x|θ2, D)  F (x|θ1, D),
Eθ˜[E(θ|θ˜, D)|θ2, D] =
∫
Θ˜
E(θ|θ˜, D)dF (θ˜|θ2, D)
>
∫
Θ˜
E(θ|θ˜, D)dF (θ˜|θ1, D) = Eθ˜[E(θ|θ˜, D)|θ1, D]. 
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Proof of Proposition 5: We first show that if nµ¯ − c ≥ w − θ, then the empty fraternity
cannot be an equilibrium. If no one joins the fraternity, then equilibrium demands that θ
expect wage w if he does not join; and the expected wages of students with ability greater
than θ who do not join exceed w. With the full support assumption, following any signal
realization θ˜, firms can hold equilibrium beliefs that the anyone who joins the fraternity
and generated that signal has ability θ. These beliefs minimize the wage of any student
who joins the fraternity. Given these beliefs, since expected wages are continuous in θ, if
nµ¯− c+ θ > w, then all students in a sufficiently small neighborhood of (θ, µ¯) would apply
for fraternity membership, and since their measure is less than Γ, the fraternity would accept
them. Hence, the empty fraternity cannot be an equilibrium.
Conversely, if nµ¯ − c ≤ w − θ, then given the pessimistic beliefs by firms, wC(θ˜) = θ so
that (θ, µ¯) at least weakly prefers not to apply to the fraternity; and all other types strictly
prefer not to apply. Hence, no one applying to the fraternity is an equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 6: To prove existence, it suffices to characterize student and frater-
nity choices via the continuous functions µA(·) and µB(·) (see Propositions 2 and 4), proving
the existence of an equilibrium in which a student type (θ, µ) is a member of the fraternity if
and only if µ ≥ max{µA(θ), µB(θ)}. In particular, given wC(·) and wC¯(·), µA(θ) solves equa-
tion (2) at equality, for µA(θ) ∈ (µ, µ¯). Since µA(·) is uniquely defined, it follows that µB(·) is
uniquely defined. We have established that µj : [θ, θ¯]→ [µ, µ¯], j = A,B, is continuous. The
space of such functions, endowed with the weak∗ topology, is compact. So, too, we can focus
on beliefs by firms about which student types are fraternity members that are summarized
by continuous functions µˆA(·) and µˆB(·) about which student types apply and which ones are
accepted by the fraternity, where (θ, µ) is a conjectured fraternity member if and only if µ ≥
max{µˆA(θ), µˆB(θ)}. These beliefs, µˆA(·), µˆB(·) then determine competitive wage functions,
(wˆC(θ˜), wˆC(θ˜)) = (E[θ|θ˜, µ ≥ max{µˆA(θ), µˆB(θ)}}], E[θ|θ˜, µ < max{µˆA(θ), µˆB(θ)}]),
and these wage functions, in turn, imply optimal student and fraternity best response choices,
µA(·), µB(·). Hence, we have a mapping from (µˆA(θ), µˆB(θ)) to (µA(θ), µB(θ)). Equilibrium
is given by a fixed point to this mapping from [conjectured by firms] optimal student and fra-
ternity choices to the best response optimal student and fraternity choices; and we have just
established that this mapping satisfies the conditions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. 
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Proof of Lemma 2: µA(θ) solves
E(wC(θ˜)|θ) + nµA(θ)− c = E(wC¯(θ˜)|θ) ⇔ E(wC(θ˜)|θ)−E(wC¯(θ˜)|θ) = c− nµA(θ).
Then µA(θ) is increasing in θ if and only if
∂
∂θ
E(wC(θ˜)− wC¯(θ˜)|θ) =
∂
∂θ
∫ ∞
−∞
wC(θ˜)− wC¯(θ˜)fθ˜(θ˜|θ)dθ˜ < 0.
Consider g(θ˜|θ) ≡ ∂
∂θ
fθ˜(θ˜|θ). As g(θ˜|θ) is the change in the distribution of signal θ˜ due to a
change in θ, the integral of g over the support of θ˜ is zero. The MLRP assumption implies
that g(θ˜|θ) is increasing in θ˜:
MLRP:
fθ˜(t2|θ +∆θ)
fθ˜(t2|θ)
>
fθ˜(t1|θ +∆θ)
fθ˜(t1|θ1)
∀t2 > t1, ∆θ > 0 implies
1
fθ˜(t2|θ)
∆fθ˜(t2|θ)
∆θ
>
1
fθ˜(t1|θ1)
∆fθ˜(t1|θ)
∆θ
Therefore,
∂
∂θ
ln fθ˜(t2|θ) ≥
∂
∂θ
ln fθ˜(t1|θ)
implying that g(θ˜|θ) is nondecreasing in θ˜; and since g integrates to zero, there exists a K
such that g(θ˜|θ) ≤ 0 for θ˜ ≤ K, and g(θ˜|θ) ≥ 0 for θ˜ > K.
Remember, we want to establish when
∂
∂θ
∫ ∞
−∞
[
wC(θ˜)− wC¯(θ˜)
]
fθ˜(θ˜|θ)dθ˜ =
∫ ∞
−∞
[
wC(θ˜)− wC¯(θ˜)
] ∂fθ˜(θ˜|θ)
∂θ
dθ˜ < 0
Subtracting [wC(K)− wC¯(K)]
∫∞
−∞
∂f
θ˜
(θ˜|θ)
∂θ
dθ˜ = 0 from the integral and breaking the multi-
plicands under the integral into two parts yields∫ ∞
−∞
((
wC(θ˜)− wC¯(θ˜)
)
− (wC(K)− wC¯(K))
) ∂fθ˜(θ˜|θ)
∂θ
dθ˜
=
∫ K
−∞
((
wC(θ˜)− wC¯(θ˜)
)
− (wC(K)− wC¯(K))
)
g(θ˜|θ)dθ˜
+
∫ ∞
K
((
wC(θ˜)− wC¯(θ˜)
)
− (wC(K)− wC¯(K))
)
g(θ˜|θ)dθ˜.
From the premise that wC(x) − wC¯(x) is decreasing, the difference in the w terms in the
first integral is positive, and negative in the second; by construction, the g term in the first
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integral is negative, and positive in the second integral. Therefore, the integral is the sum
of two negative values.
Finally, inspection reveals that an analogous argument holds if there are a finite number
of signals, θ˜, interpreting the signal density fθ˜(θ˜|θ) as the probability mass on signal θ˜. 
Proof of Proposition 7: Denote the set of students with θ < θ0 as P , the set of students
in fraternity as P2, and the rest P1; and let m(·) be the measure of students in the argument
set. Then
wC(θ˜) = E(θ|θ˜, P2) and wC¯(θ˜) = E(θ|θ˜, P ∪ P1).
Rewrite wC¯ as
wC¯(θ˜) =
m(P )
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|θ˜, P ) +
m(P1)
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|θ˜, P1).
Take two signals, H and L, with H > L. Then the expected wage premium is decreasing if
E(θ|H,P2)−
[
m(P )
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|H,P ) +
m(P1)
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|H,P1)
]
< E(θ|L, P2)−
[
m(P )
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|L, P ) +
m(P1)
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|L, P1)
]
. (3)
Observe that θ0 → θ¯ implies:
E(θ|H,P2)→ θ¯ and E(θ|L, P2) → θ¯
m(P )
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|H,P ) +
m(P1)
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|H,P1) → E(θ|H)
m(P )
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|L, P ) +
m(P1)
m(P ) +m(P1)
E(θ|L, P1) → E(θ|L).
Therefore, as θ0 → θ¯, (3) approaches
θ¯ − E(θ|H) < θ¯ − E(θ|L),
which holds as by the MLRP assumption, E(θ|H) > E(θ|L). As the distribution of θ has full
support, and there are no atoms in the distribution, E(θ|H, θ > θ0) and E(θ|H, θ < θ0) are
continuous in θ0. Therefore, there exists a θˆ0(H,L) < θ¯ such that for all θ0 ≥ θˆ0(H,L), the
expected wage premium of fraternity members is decreasing in θ˜. This bound on θ0 depends
on the signals H and L; however, Assumption 1 ensures the existence of a uniform bound. In
particular, if the support θ˜ is finite, then the uniform bound is the maximum of the bounds
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for each signal pair; and if the support of θ˜ is not finite, but the support of fθ˜(θ˜|θ¯) is non-
trivial, then the expected wage difference that θ¯ expects places strictly positive probability
on signals bounded away from θˆ. Hence, there exists a small enough Γ > 0 such that for
Γ < Γ, the equilibrium expected wage premium from fraternity membership is declining in
ability. 
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